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THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
Admiralty
ADMIRALTY LAW -

1972 AMENDMENTS TO THE LONGSHOREMEN'S AND
HARBOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT - "SITUS" TEST Is No LONGER
TO BE USED; INJURED WORKMAN NEED PROVE ONLY His "STATUS" AS A
MARITIME WORKER.

Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Director (1976)

Wallace Johns, a member of the International Longshoremen's
Association,' was hired for one day as a "shape-up" 2 employee by Sea-Land
Service, Inc. (Sea-Land), a freight carrier that performed both shipping and
motor freight operations.' Assigned the job of shuttle driver, he moved items
by rig between Sea-Land's old and new terminal facilities. 4 On a return trip
from the new terminal, Johns was injured when his rig overturned on a
public street.

5

Johns filed a claim against Sea-Land with the New Jersey Department
of Labor and Industry and received payments under the New Jersey
compensation plan.6 Later, he filed a second claim under the Federal
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (Act),7 which

provided for greater benefits." The administrative law judge, finding that
Johns was engaged in maritime employment at the time of the accident, but
that he was not injured at a site covered by the Act, denied recovery.9
However, the Benefits Review Board (Board) determined that the site of the
accident was within the covered area and granted recovery. 10 On appeal,"
1. Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Director, 540 F.2d 629, 632 (3d Cir. 1976).
2. Id. A "shape-up" employee is an individual employed under a system of hiring
longshoremen by having applicants gather in a semicircle at least once a day for
selection of a union-appointed hiring boss of those to work on that day or shift.
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2087 (1971). Technically, the SeaLand court misused the term "shape-up," since that type of employment arrangement
had been illegal in New Jersey since 1953 and had been replaced by statutorily
prescribed employment information centers. Waterfront Commission Act, N.J. STAT.
ANN. §32:23-52 (West 1963). Johns was actually hired at one of these employment
information centers. 540 F.2d at 632.
3. 540 F.2d at 631.
4. Id. at 632.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. 33 U.S.C. §§901-950 (1970), as amended by Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576, §§1-22, 86 Stat.
1251-1265.
8. 540 F.2d at 632.
9. Id. at 631; see notes 29 & 30, and accompanying text infra.
10. 540 F.2d at 631.
11. Johns proceeded under a provision in the 1972 Amendments to the Act which
allows an employee to appeal directly to the circuit court from a final Board order.
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972, 33
U.S.C. §921(c) (Supp. V 1975).

(596)
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the Third Circuit, 12 concluding that both the administrative law judge and
the Board had misinterpreted congressional intent, 13 remanded, holding,
that as long as an employee is engaged in maritime activity at the time of
the injury, compensation under the Act is available regardless of the situs of
the accident. Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Director, 540 F.2d 629 (3d Cir. 1976).
The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act of 1927
was drafted to fill a void created by Supreme Court maritime compensation
decisions of the previous decade. In three companion cases decided in 1917,
the Court held that state workmen's compensation statutes were constitutional. 14 However, in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,15 decided shortly
thereafter, the Court held that state workmen's compensation laws were
inoperative where the injury occurred upon the navigable waters of the
United States. 16 In reaction to Jensen, Congress attempted by statute in
191717 and 192218 to allow state compensation laws to cover injuries to
maritime workers which occurred on the navigable waters of the United
States. Both statutes, however, were declared unconstitutional on the ground
that Maritime workers came under congressional admiralty jurisdiction, 19
20
which required uniform federal regulation.
Congress passed the Act in 1927 to provide uniform coverage to all
maritime workers who could not be constitutionally covered by state laws. 21
Unfortunately, the Act contained several provisions which limited its
12. The case was heard by Judges Aldisert, Garth, and Gibbons. Judge Gibbons
wrote the opinion.
13. 540 F.2d at 634.
14. Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917). Hawkins v. Bleakly,

243 U.S. 210 (1917); New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917). In each case,
the employers had argued that the imposition on them of liability without fault for
industrial accidents violated the due process clause of the Federal Constitution. 243
U.S. at 235; 243 U.S. at 214; 243 U.S. at 204.
15. 244 U.S. 205 (1917). In this case the Supreme Court held that the New York
State compensation law could not be applied to Jensen, who had been injured on a
gangplank connecting the ship to the pier. Since he was injured on "navigable waters
of the U.S.," he could be compensated only by Congress. Id. at 216-17.
16. Id. at 216, 218.
17. Act of Oct. 6, 1917, Pub. L. No. 82, §2916, 40 Stat. 395.
18. Act of June 10, 1922, Pub. L. No. 239, § 745, 42 Stat. 634.
19. Article III of the Constitution grants admiralty jurisdiction to the Supreme
Court, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, but the Court has held that the Constitution also
extends this jurisdiction to Congress: "As the Constitution extends the judicial power
of the United States to 'all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,' and as this
jurisdiction is held to be exclusive, the power of legislation on the same subject must
necessarily be in the national legislature, and not in the state legislatures." Butler v.
Boston S.S. Co., 130 U.S. 527, 557 (1889).
20. Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924); Knickerbocker Ice Co.
v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920). In Dawson the Court stated:
Without doubt Congress has power to alter, amend or revise the maritime law
by statutes of general application embodying its will and judgment. This power,
we think, would permit enactment of a general employers' liability law or general
provisions for compensating injured employees; but it may not be delegated to the
several States.
264 U.S. at 227.
21. This congressional purpose was made evident in the House Report:
The bill ... , therefore, will enable Congress to discharge its obligations to
the maritime workers placed under their jurisdiction by the Constitution of the
United States by providing for them a law whereby they may receive the benefits
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coverage and which left the relationsl.,* between the Act and "the otherwise
22
applicable State Compensation Act shrouded in impenetrF. le confusion.
In particular, the Act imposed both status and situs requi.,ements upon the
injured employee: one seeking to recover was required to be engaged "in
maritime employment" at the time of the injury,23 while the injury itself
must have occurred "upon the navigable waters of the United States
(including any dry dock)." 24 However, even if these two requirements were
met, coverage would be extended only if the employee was not covered by a
state compensation plan. 25 Thus, the statute, instead of extending federal
coverage for the entire longshoring operation, 26 merely provided a remedy
for the gap created by the Jensen holding: 27 seamen were covered by the
Jones Act;28 longshoremen working on land were covered by state
compensation plans; and longshoremen working on the navigable waters of
the United States were covered by the Act.
For four decades the Court, in interpreting the situs and status
requirements of the Act, wrestled with the questions of how far inland the
"navigable waters of the United States (including dry dock)" extended and
which acts of employment were maritime in nature and which were not.2 9 In
1969, the court attempted to clarify its position in Nacirema OperatingCo. v.
of workmen's compensation and thus afford them the same remedies that have
been provided by legislation for those killed or injured in the course of their
employment in nearly every State in the Union.
H.R. REP. No. 1767, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1927).
22. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY §6-46, at 409 (2d ed. 1975);
see id. §§6-45 to -51.
23. 33 U.S.C. §902(4) (1970). The complete section reads as follows: "The term
'employer' means an employer any of whose employees are employed in maritime
employment, in whole or in part, upon the navigable waters of the United States
(including any dry dock)." Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. §903(a).

26. Two commentators have stated:

The apparent intention of the Congress was to confine the operation of the
Federal'Act to the federal or maritime side of the Supreme Court's line; up to that
line the State Acts were to continue in full force and effect. That is to say,
Congress (apparently) aimed not at the broadest possible coverage (up to the full
limits of it own constitutional powers) but at the narrowest possible coverage ....

C. BLACK, supra note 22, at 417.
27. For the Court's holding in Jensen, see text accompanying note 15 supra.
28. 46 U.S.C. §688 (1970). The Jones Act allows seamen injured at their
employment to sue their employers in federal courts. Id.
29. For example, in Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc., 314 U.S. 244 (1941), the
Supreme Court upheld a federal court award to the widow of a janitor who made a

G.

GILMORE &

one-time excursion upon navigable waters to help a fellow employee test an outboard

engine and died when the boat capsized. Id. at 244-45. The Court, attaching no
significance to the fact that the decedent had not normally been engaged in maritime
activities, stated: "[Hiabitual performance of other and different duties on land
cannot alter the fact that at the time of the accident he was riding in a boat on a
navigable river, and it is in connection with that clearly maritime activity that the
award was here made." Id. at 247 (footnote omitted). However, a year later the Court
reversed a state court's denial of state compensation to the widow of an employee who
died while engaged in dismantling a bridge from a barge situated on navigable
waters. Davis v. Department of Labor & Indus., 317 U.S. 249 (1942). The Court

admitted that this created a "twilight zone in which the employees must have their
rights determined case by case." Id. at 256.
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Johnson,30 which held that the Act permitted recovery for all injuries on
"navigable waters" but that recovery for injuries sustained on land was
limited to those occurring on dry docks. 31 It was the province of Congress,
stressed the Court, to expand the scope of coverage for injuries incurred on
32
land.
The 1972 Amendments to the Act (1972 Amendments) were Congress'
response to this suggestion. 33 Under the Amendments, an employee in
maritime employment included any person engaged in longshoring
operations, 34 and the land area included within the expression "navigable
waters of the United States" was expanded to include not just dry docks but
also piers, wharfs, terminals, and other areas normally used in the
longshoring operation. 35 The 1972 Amendments also did away with the
limiting reference to state law. 36 While many courts interpreted the 1972
Amendments to require both the status and situs tests, 37 some commentators
proposed that recovery under the Act should hinge not upon the injured
employee's status, but only upon his relation to a situs within the coverage
30. 396 U.S. 212 (1969). In this case the Supreme Court reversed the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which had granted federal recovery to a longshoreman
injured on a pier permanently affixed to the shore. Id. at 214, reversing Marine
Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting, 398 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1968).
31. 396 U.S. at 220-21. The Court stated that "Congress intended to exercise its
full jurisdiction seaward of the Jensen line." Id. at 220.
32. Id. at 223. The Court admitted that its holding created a lack of uniform
treatment of injured longshoremen, but stated that "[t]he invitation to move that line
landwar d must be addressed in Congress, not to this Court." Id. at 224.
33. For a general discussion of the 1972 Amendments, see Comment, Broadened
Coverage Under the LHWCA, 33 LA. L. REV. 683 (1973); Comment, Negligence
Standards Under the 1972 Amendments to the LHWCA: Examining ithe Viewpoints,
21 ViLL. L. REV. 244 (1976).
34. Section 902(3) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. §902(3) (Supp. V 1975), defines "employee"
as "any person engaged in maritime employment, including any longshoreman or
other person engaged in longshoring operations .... " Id. This section retains the
exclusion of ship masters and crew members, both of whom are covered by the Jones
Act, 46 U.S.C. .688 (1970).
35. Section 902(4) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 902(4) (Supp. V 1975), defines "employer"
as follows:
An employer any of whose employees are employed in maritime employment, in
whole or in part, upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any
adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other
adjoining area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing,
or building a vessel.
Id.

36. Id. §903(a). It is clear, therefore, that federal coverage, if appropriate, will be

extended, even if state coverage is available.
37. Circuit courts that have considered the question have agreed on the need for
both tests. The Fourth Circuit has stated that the recent amendments "established a
dual test for coverage." I.T.O. Corp. v. Benefits Review Bd., 529 F.2d 1080, 1083 (4th
Cir. 1975), rehearing en banc, 542 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1976). In that case the court held
that while the three employees working on a pier met the situs test, there could be no
recovery since the employees were not directly involved in loading goods from the last
point of rest on land to the ship, or in unloading from the ship to the first point of rest
on shore. 529 F.2d at 1087-88. According to this court, the definition of the status of
maritime workers included only those who were directly involved in loading and
unloading ships. Id. However, upon rehearing en banc, the Fourth Circuit allowed
recovery for two of the three injured employees. Recovery was still based upon
employment with regard to loading or unloading a ship, but the requirement of being

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol22/iss3/7

4

Carey: Admiralty

[Vol. 22

VILLANOVA LAw REVIEW

of the Act.38 Never prior to the Sea-Land court, however, had it been
suggested that only a status test be employed.
In reaching its decision in the instant case, the Third Circuit examined
the legislative history and judicial precedent surrounding the 1972
Amendments to the Act, recognizing that these changes "manifest[ed] an
unmistakable congressional intention to afford federal coverage for injuries
occurring in areas inland of the navigable waters of the United States where
prior to 1972 Congress had deferred to state law.

' 39

In addition, the court

stated that the Act and its recent amendments were based upon Congress'
40
admiralty jurisdiction and not upon its commerce power.
Focusing upon the scope of the 1972 Amendments, the Sea-Land court
determined that the limits of the Act's extended coverage should be defined
functionally by examining the employee's status as a maritime worker i.e., one engaged in the longshoring operation of loading or discharging
cargo - rather than spatially by concentrating upon the geographical situs
directly involved was dropped. I.T.O. Corp. v. Benefits Review Bd., 542 F.2d 903, 905
(4th Cir. 1976).

In contrast to the Fourth Circuit, the First, Second, and Fifth Circuits have
stressed the situs test. In Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son, 539 F.2d 264 (lst Cir.
1976), petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3332 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1976) (No. 76-571), the
First Circuit allowed recovery to a plaintiff who was injured while removing cargo

from a container that had been off-loaded from a vessel three days earlier. 539 F.2d at
266. The court stated that "a claimant's status need not depend wholly on the job
being performed at the very moment of injury." Id. at 274. In Pittston Stevedoring
Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom., I.T.O. v. Blundo,

97 S. Ct. 522 (1977), and Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 97 S. Ct. 522
(1977), the Second Circuit held that the stripping of cargo from huge containers, even
if done at a waterfront area remote from where the ship was actually unloaded, was
"the functional equivalent of sorting cargo discharged from a ship," and therefore
was an activity covered by the Act. 544 F.2d at 53. For a discussion of the Fifth
Circuit's position, see notes 53-57 and accompanying text infra. In Sea.Land, the
administrative law judge and the Board agreed on the necessity of both tests. 540 F.2d
at 631. They agreed that Johns met the status test, but disagreed on whether or not he
met the situs test. Id. at 631, 634. The Board overruled the administrative law judge
because it believed that a public street within the terminal area was covered by the
amendments. Id. at 631.
38. Two commentators have suggested that the line drawn in the congressional
committee reports between workers who participate directly or physically in ship
loading and unloading, and those who are required to be in the area but who do not
participate physically or directly in "maritime" work, will not work in practice. G.
GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 22, at 430. These commentators believe that a grave
injustice would be done to secretaries or truckers if they were not allowed to recover
for injuries suffered on a pier. Id. Moreover, they believe that the courts should ignore
the committee reports and follow the same path that prior courts have followed in
Jones Act cases, i.e., "a female secretary who works in a terminal warehouse should
qualify as a LHCA harbor worker in exactly the same -waythat female hairdresser in
a cruise ship's beauty salon qualifies as a Jones Act seaman." Id. For a discussion of
the House and Senate Committee Reports, see notes 43 & 44 and accompanying text
infm.
39. 540 F.2d at 634.
40. Id. at 635. Although the court recognized that Congress could have used its
commerce power to enact a federal workmen's compensation scheme, it believed that
Congress did not intend to get involved in jury trial problems that would thereby be
involved. Id. The court stated that "it is well-settled that no right to jury trial exists"
under congressional admiralty jurisdiction. Id.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1977

5

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [1977], Art. 7

1976-1977]

1THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW

of the injury. 41 In support of its position, the court noted that the primary
goal of Congress in extending coverage to areas previously left to state
control was to provide uniformity in the death and disability compensation
42
system for all maritime workers, regardless of where the injury occurred.
The court relied upon House and Senate reports accompanying the 1972
Amendments, 43 which stressed that one result of the 1927 Act was a
disparity in benefits for the same type of injury to the same class of
employee "depending on which side of the water's edge . . . the accident
44
occur[red]."
The court stated that the reference in sections 902(4) and 903(a) of the
1972 Amendments to the "navigable waters of the United States" was
merely a means of relating the "function being performed by the injured
'4 5
Finding
employee to waterborne transportation, the jurisdictional nexus.
that the list of land areas included in the definition of "navigable waters"
was not exclusive, 46 the court noted that although "Congress was cautious
in its language . . ., the fact remains that it intended to expand the scope of
LHWCA to provide a federal workmen's compensation remedy for all
47
maritime employees."
41. Id. at 636. The court explained:
The limits of federal coverage is [sic] defined not by reference to a geographic
relationship with the navigable waters of the United States, but by the location of
the interface between the air land and the water modes of transportation. If that
interface is customarily located at some point remote from the pier, the fact that
the stevedore uses public streets to move the cargo to or from a "terminal," a
"building" or "other adjoining area" does not affect coverage. The key is the
functional relationship of the employee's activity to maritime transportation, as
distinguished from such land-based activities as trucking, railroading or warehousing.
42. Id. at 638. The court believed that Congress wanted to eliminate the feature of
the original act that allowed workers to "walk into federal coverage and out of state
coverage, and vice versa, in the course of a day's work." Id.
43. Id. at 637-38, citing S. REP. No. 1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT], and H.R. REP No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1011 (1972) [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT], reprintedin [1972] 3 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4707-08.
44. SENATE REPORT, supra note 43, at 13; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 43, at 10.
The legislators noted that increases in federal benefits would sharpen this disparity.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 43, at 13; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 43, at 10. The
reports, which clearly show Congress' goal in enacting the amendments, state that
"the compensation payable to a longshoreman or a ship repairman or builder should
not depend on the fortuitous circumstances of whether the injury occurred on land or
on water." SENATE REPORT, supra note 43, at 13; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 43, at 10.
However, the reports also state that Congress did not "intend to cover employees who
are not engaged in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel, just because
they are injured in an area adjoining navigable water# used for such activity."
SENATE REPORT, supra note 43, at 13; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 43, at 10. In
addition, the reports state that Congress did not intend to cover individuals
"employed by a person none of whose employees work, in whole or in part, on
navigable waters . . ., even if injured on a pier adjoining navigable waters." SENATE
REPORT, supra note 43, at 13; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 43, at 10.
45. 540 F.2d at 638. The court explained that "[lt is the situs of the vessels in
maritime commerce, not the situs of their maritime employees at the time of the
injury, that in our view Congress referred to by its reference to navigable waters." Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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Since the court determined that the. status of an employee as one
engaged in maritime activities was the crucial issue in determining his
coverage under the Act,48 it agreed with -th Board that th, "act that Johns'
injury occurred on a public street did not eliminate . -in from federal
coverage. 49 However, because a "shape-up" employee may perform both
maritime and non-maritime tasks,50 the Third Circuit remanded the case to
the administrative law judge 5l to develop evidence as to Johns' specific
52
function at the time of his injury.
The Third Circuit's decision that the 1972 Amendments require only
that the injured employee have the status of a maritime worker may, in
certain.instances, produce more equitable results than those achieved by the
courts utilizing the situs test. This can be demonstrated through an
examination of the Fifth Circuit's recent decision in Jacksonville Shipyards
v. Perdue,5 3 where relief was denied to a longshoreman injured near his
employer's office.5 4 The vessel on which the plaintiff had been working was
located a mile away from the office and separated from it by facilities not
used for loading or unloading ships. 5 The Fifth Circuit rejected the
argument that the Act, as amended, "covers every point in a large marine
'56
It is
facility where a ship repairman might go at his employer's direction.
submitted that the Third Circuit would grant recovery to an employee
injured at any point in a large marine facility, as long as he met the status
test. 57 In fact, as in the instant case, coverage may extend beyond the
marine facility to the public streets. In this regard, the result reached by the
Third Circuit appears consistent with the intent of Congress "to permit a
uniform compensation system to apply to employees who would otherwise be
covered by the Act for part of their activity."5 8
Moreover, the Third Circuit's indication that a broader definition of
status is justified5 9 may help to avoid the unjust results which can be
produced if too narrow a definition is used. For example, in I.T.O. Corp. v.
0
Benefits Review Board,6
the Fourth Circuit defined "maritime employment"
in such a way as to limit it to only those employees who moved cargo from
48. See notes 37-42 and accompanying text supra.
49. 540 F.2d at 639.
50. Id.
51. The Act provides that the administrative law judge is the trier of fact. 33
U.S.C. §921(b)(3) (Supp. V 1975).
52. 540 F.2d at 640.
53. 539 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1976), petition for cert. filed sub nom., P.C. Pfeiffer Co.
v. Ford, 45 U.S.L.W. 3364 (U.S. Nov. 8, 1976) (76-641).

54. Id. at 542.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. However, the Third Circuit might have denied recovery to the plaintiff in the
Jacksonville Shipyards case (see notes 53-56 and accompanying text supra), not
because of the situs test, but because of his lack of maritime status at the time of the
injury - he had finished his maritime tasks and was reporting to the office to check
out. 539 F.2d at 541. For a discussion of the problems inherent in deciding at what
point in time an employee ceases to be engaged in m ari:*-ne work, see note 67 infra.
58. SENATE REPORT, supra 43, at 13; HousE RE.~ R , supra note 43, at 10-11.
59. 540 F.2d at 638-39.
60. 529 F.2d 1080 (4th Cir. 197"), rehearingen banc, 542 F.2d 903 (4th ,r. 1976).
For a discussion of this case, see note 37 supra.
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the vessel to the first "point of rest" on the pier, or who moved cargo from
the last "point of rest" on shore to the vessel.6 ' As a result, longshoremen
who met the situs test were denied recovery even though they were
62
performing tasks which would normally be considered maritime work.
While the Third Circuit's elimination of the situs test may in many
instances produce more equitable results, it does present several problems.
First, it may extend the coverage of the Act well beyond that which
Congress intended. 6 ' Moreover, the Third Circuit's elimination of the situs
test may adversely affect the recovery of individuals who are injured while
working on a pier or another area covered by the Act, but who are not
directly engaged in maritime work. In practice, this could result in a less
equitable solution than that achieved by courts using only the situs test or a
combination of both tests. For example, a person engaged in clerical work
may be just as necessary to the job of expediting shipping as the
longshoremen who actually loads or unloads a vessel, yet the Third Circuit,
61. 529 F.2d at 1088.
62. Id. at 1082. In Sea-Land the Third Circuit implied that it agreed with the
dissenting opinion in the I.T.O. case, which argued that the definition of maritime
employment should not be narrowed by the majority's "point of rest" rule. 540 F.2d at
638, citing I.T.O. Corp. v. Benefits Review Bd., 529 F.2d 1080, 1097 (4th Cir. 1975)
(Cramer, J., dissenting). The Sea-Land court expressed its own perception of
congressional intent as follows: "The line which Congress intended to draw was
between maritime commerce and land commerce, and the coverage of the federal law
starts at the point where the cargo passes to or from an employer engaged in the
former to an employer engaged in the latter." 540 F.2d at 639.
63. Consider, for example, the case of a draftsman who, while working on the
blueprints of a new ship, was injured in his employer's office hundreds of miles
inland. Would the Third Circuit allow him to recover under the 1972 Amendments? In
deciding such a case, the court would hardly be able to ignore the fact that the reports
seem to limit coverage to a specified list of areas and "other area[s] adjoining such
navigable waters." SENATE REPORT, supra note 43, at 13; HOUSE REPORT, supra note
43, at 10. However, the court has stated that it does not "construe this enumeration of
covered areas to be an exclusive enumeration." 540 F.2d at 638. Therefore, it is
submitted that the court would decide that the congressional intent to extend coverage
should override any apparent limitation contained in the actual language of the
reports or the Act itself and would allow recovery to such an employee.
Although not going as far as this hypothetical situation, the Third Circuit, in
Dravo Corp. v. Maxin, 545 F.2d 374 (3d Cir. 1976), recently reaffirmed and extended
its approach in Sea-Land. Louis Maxin was injured at Dravo's Engineering Works,
located on Neville Island in the Ohio River below Pittsburgh. Id. at 376. Employed in
making steel plates which would ultimately become bottoms and decks of barges, he
never loaded or unloaded ships. Id. Although the plant was located at the other side
of the island from the boat yards, the court stated:
The great majority of the work performed in the shop is related to shipbuilding or
ship repair. There is no delineation of the work into shipbuilding and
nonshipbuilding functions. Thus, the structural steel shop and the work
performed there is an integral part of Dravo's shipbuilding operations at the
complex. Because we feel the Congress was familiar with the assembly-line
methods employed in American manufacturing, we hold that the congressional
intent underlying the extension of the LHWCA is best effectuated by extending
coverage to the labor force in such a building once the "functional relationship"
test of Johns has been met.
Id. at 381. But see Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Director, No. 75-168 (3d Cir., Mar. 17, 1977),
where the court returned to the strict insistance of Johns that the employee be
engaged in maritime employment at the exact moment of injury and remanded the
case for factual findings on the issue.
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construing the words "engaged in maritime employment" to mean only
those actually involved in longshoring operations, would probably find that
such a worker was covered only by state compensation plans and not by the
Act.6
Another problem inherent in the court's adoption of the status test and
elimination of the situs test is timing: when does an employee begin and end
his maritime work? In Sea-Land, for example, Johns was admittedly
engaged in maritime employment on the trip from the old to the new berth,"
but the court remanded the case to the administrative law judge to
determine the nature of Johns' employment on the return trip.6" It is
submitted that the court's requirement that the trier of fact look not at the
general nature of the injured employee's work, but at the work assignment
he was engaged in at the precise moment of injury, will lead to overexact
distinctions"7 leading to inequitable results."
64. Two commentators who believe that the language of the Act does not demand
this injustice have stated:
The new statutory language can reasonably be read to mean that all persons
who suffer employment-related injuries within the Act's expanded territorial
limits are covered, provided only that they are employed by an employer "any of
whose employees are employed in maritime employment .... " If the language is
so read ... , most maritime workers injured on or near navigable waters will be
able to claim benefits ....
G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 22, at 429, quoting 33 U.S.C. §902(4) (Supp. V
1975). They admit that the congressional reports clearly deny coverage to clerks,
truckers, and others who are not "directly involved in loading or unloading
functions," SENATE REPORT, supra note 43, at 13; HOUSE

REPORT,

supra note 43, at 11,

but they point out that the reports also express a desire to expand coverage and that
in the 1972 Amendments, Congress did extend coverage beyond dry docks to all areas
"customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing or building a
vessel." 33 U.S.C. §903(a) (Supp. V 1975). The amendments, unlike the reports, do not
say "directly involved in loading or unloading." In fact, it is difficult to understand
why Congress would extend coverage to terminals and marine railways if coverage
was to be limited to those "directly involved in loading and unloading." For these
reasons the commentators would extend coverage to secretaries or janiL ors injured
within the covered areas, as long as they were employed by a maritimo - )loyer. G.
GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 22, at 430.

65. There was a factual finding that the cargo Johns was transporting had just
been taken off a vessel. 540 F.2d at 639.
66. Id. at 640.
67. Under the Third Circuit's order, the administrative law judge will, without
any guidelines, have to decide problems such as the following: What if Johns was
driving an empty truck at the time of the accident? Did his maritime employment
cease at the time he unloaded the maritime cargo at the new berth? Or, was he still
engaged in maritime work until he returned to the old berth and received a new
assignment? Or, did the status change take place at the halfway point of the return
trip?
68. It is suggested that if the Third Circuit had been confronted with the same
situation as the Fifth Circuit faced in Jacksonville Shipyards v. Perdue, 539 F.2d 533
(5th Cir. 1976), Petition for cert. filed sub nom., P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 45 U.S.L.W.
3364 (U.S. Nov. 8, 1976) (76-641), it would have decided against the injured employee
and thereby caused an inequity. The Fifth Circuit denied recovery to the injured
employee because, in the court's opinion, he was injured in an area beyond that
covered by the Act. Id. at 542. Although the Third Circuit would not be concerned that
the employee was beyond the covered situs, it would probably deny recovery because
at the time he was injured he had ceased maritime employment and was merely
checking out for the day. Id. at 541. It is arguable that if a worker has been engaged in
maritime activity all day, his maritime status should extend until he has checked out.
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Finally, it is submitted that even though Sea-Land achieved a result
more equitable than that proposed in previous cases, the Third Circuit
should have adopted an even broader definition of "maritime employment,"
one that would have included employees who, although not engaged in
loading or unloading ships, are essential to the longshoring operation, and
those who, although engaged in maritime employment most of the day, were
not so employed at the exact moment of injury. Indeed, in Dravo Corp. v.
Maxin,"" the Third Circuit took a large step in this direction when it
accepted the maritime status of the injured employee despite the fact that
only eighty-five percent of his work day was devoted to maritime
employment.'" The court did not remand, as it had in Sea-Land, for a factual
finding regarding the nature of the employee's work at the exact moment of
injury. In so holding, the court appeared to modify the timing component of
the Sea-Land test.7'
Whether the Third Circuit's decision to apply only a status test for
determining recovery under the Act is the correct interpretation, and
whether its definition of "maritime employment" is too broad or too narrow,
will shortly be answered by the Supreme Court, which has granted certiorari
in a similar Second Circuit case.7 2 Until the Supreme Court speaks,
therefore, in the Third Circuit, while an employee engaged in maritime work
will be protected by federal coverage regardless of where his injury occurs, a
nonmaritime worker injured on a pier or dry dock must look to state statutes
for compensation.
Edward P. Carey
Equity would seem to demand that the definition of "maritime employment" be at
least broad enough to include such an employee.
Moreover, while the Third Circuit's view that a person must be engaged in
maritime employment at the exact moment of injury is in keeping with Congress'
intention not "to cover employees who are not engaged in loading, unloading,
repairing, or building a vessel, just because they are injured in an area adjoining
navigable waters used for such activity," SENATE REPORT, supra note 43, at 13;
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 43, at 11; such a policy would seem to ignore the intent of
Congress "to permit a uniform compensation system to apply to employees who would
otherwise be covered by this Act for part of their activity." SENATE REPORT, supra
note 43, at 13; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 43, at 10-11.
69. 545 F.2d 374 (3d Cir. 1976); see note 63 supra.
70. 545 F.2d at 376.
71. In Dravo, the Third Circuit acknowledged that "Congress was familiar with
the assembly-line methods employed in American manufacturing" and therefore
believed that Congress intended to extend coverage to the entire labor force in such a
plant. Id. at 381.
72. Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35 (2d Cir.), cert. granted
sub nom., I.T.O. Co. v. Blundo, 97 S. Ct. 522 (1977), and Northeast Marine Terminal
Co. v. Caputo, 97 S. Ct. 522 (1977).
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